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Abstract  
This paper reviews the literature on the prevalence of constitutional review across 
the world, and particularly in emerging democracies, during the last two decades. 
Two major questions should be addressed in this regard. First, why has the 
judiciary been empowered and what factors affect judicial activism? Second, does 
constitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function? In sum, the 
literature shows that constitutional review can make democracy self-enforcing if 
there is sufficient competition among political parties or between the legislature 
and the executive branch of government. In a more sophisticated case, political 
balance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions.  
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 Introduction 
 
The growing influence of the judiciary in politics has been a recently burgeoning field of 
research in both developed and developing democracies. This phenomenon has been 
described among others as the judicialization of politics, which “should normally mean 
either (1) the expansion of the province of the courts or the judges at the expense of the 
politicians and/or the administrators, that is, the transfer of decision-making rights 
from the legislature, the cabinet, or the civil service to the courts, or at least, (2) the 
spread of judicial decision-making methods outside the judicial province proper” 
(Vallinder 1995, 13). The judicialization of politics is probably most evident in judicial 
review and particularly in constitutional review.  
At present, more than 80 percent of the constitutions around the world have 
provisions for constitutional review (Ginsburg 2008, 81). Western democracies adopted 
constitutional review after World War II, and most Third Wave democracies followed 
suit. The spread of constitutional review has theoretical importance for democratic 
consolidation. The sustenance of democracy requires a self-enforcing mechanism that 
deters majoritarian tyranny and/or coordinates opposition against it (Weingast 1997; 
Weingast 2005). Constitutions are believed to ensure that mechanism by embodying a 
clear criterion of the violation of social consensus, or focal points, on which democracy is 
based (Weingast 2005). However, in practice, the legislative majority can pass a law 
that contradicts the constitution. Constitutional review aims to rectify such 
constitutional violations by the majority. Past research on constitutional review has 
centered on the United States, where the system of separation of powers makes the 
judiciary a natural actor in political processes. For other countries, there has been little 
political analysis of constitutional review, except for descriptive studies (Volcansek 
1992; Tate and Vallinder 1995). Only since the last ten years, political processes of 
judicial review have been scrutinized through empirical analysis for both developed and 
emerging democracies.  
This paper addresses two questions. First, why did constitutional review become a 
norm in both established and new democracies, and what factors affect referrals to and 
the decisions of the constitutional/supreme court? Second, more theoretically, does 
constitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function, and what factors 
enhance the independence of the court? In this regard, of particular importance is 
abstract review in which new laws are examined for their constitutionality without any 
case in dispute. Abstract review can thus check the behavior of the incumbent. On the 
other hand, a concrete review arises from individual cases involving interested parties, 
and the laws in question have been passed by previous governments most of the time. 
This paper focuses on abstract review. Although the United States has no provision for 
this review, its cases are included here due to the theoretical importance of previous 
voluminous research on this topic. In the following sections, constitutional review refers 
to both abstract and concrete reviews, while abstract constitutional review is stated as 
such. 
The remainder of this paper consists of three sections. The first section discusses the 
reasons for the spread of constitutional review across the world as well as factors that 
encourage recourse to constitutional review. The second section examines judicial 
independence with reference to their determinants. The last section summarizes the 
major findings and evaluates their implications for the theory of endogenous democracy.  
 
 
The Spread and Frequency of Constitutional Review 
 
The spread of constitutional review across the world has rested on normative belief as 
well as elite strategy. First, the initial belief that underlay the spread of constitutional 
review in Western Europe after World War II assumed that the legislature might make 
mistakes, which constitutional review could rectify. Constitutional review has come to 
be regarded as congruent with parliamentary systems (Sweet 2000, 31; 49–50). During 
the Third Wave of democratization, a large number of countries followed suit and 
adopted the (German) type of constitutional review with open access and centralized 
review (Ginsburg 2003, 34–64). Since there are few qualifications for litigants and court 
decisions are final and binding, this type of review generated a strong incentive for 
interested parties to resort to constitutional review.  
  Second, from the perspective of real politics, the former elite need constitutional 
review to prepare for loss of power during democratization or political uncertainty. 
Ginsburg’s (2003, 34–64) cross-country analysis demonstrated that when party systems 
are competitive during democratic transitions, the incumbent elite chooses 
constitutional review that has more open access and whose judges are appointed for 
longer terms to insure against loss of political power. Even after transitions to 
democracy, minority elites might retain or exercise power against democratic majorities 
through the judiciary. Increasing activism of the U.S. Supreme Court after the Civil War 
emanated from the Republican Party’s attempt to delegate greater power to the court by 
using its majority in the Senate and the Republican presidents’ appointment powers, 
despite being the minority in the House (Gillman 2002). These examples constitute 
counter-majoritarian judicial review that strikes down “a legislative act or the action of 
an elected executive” (Whittington 2006, 283–284). 
A more blatant form of counter-majoritarianism is hegemonic preservation. Hirschl 
(2004) argues that the empowering of the judiciary resulted from old (“hegemonic”) 
elites’ attempt in culturally divided societies to preserve their power, which had been 
threatened by the emergence of peripheral groups, most prominently in Israel, New 
Zealand, Canada, and South Africa. In these countries, major constitutional changes 
reinforced negative rather than positive freedom and curtailed state power. The net 
effect of this constitutionalization of bill of rights was not so much the improvement of 
socioeconomic conditions of the marginalized groups as the enhancement of 
neoliberalizm and “hegemonic preservation.” The old elite, such as secular European 
Jews in the case of Israel, delegate politically central and socially divisive issues to the 
constitutional court, whose decisions reflect its views and interests It is doubtful, 
however, that counter-majoritarian review is self-sustainable in the long run under 
competitive political environments. Barak-Erez (2002) also demonstrated for Israel that 
supreme court decisions on non-ideological/secular issues did not effectively change 
political practice and power relations. 
Third, not the opposition, but the current officeholders, especially in presidential 
systems, can occasionally find benefits in constitutional review. This is when presidents 
are constrained from carrying out their policy due to obstruction by powerful minorities. 
The current officeholders have thus taken advantage of constitutional review, for 
instance, to contain the demand for more federalism, to break the status quo of vested 
interests, and to annul the compromises offered for retaining the precarious coalitions. 
This “friendly judicial activism” (Whittington 2005) can be more accountable to the 
electorate and thus more sustainable than counter-majoritarian judicial review, which 
is more often the case.  
Although constitutional review has become a worldwide phenomenon, there is 
considerable variation in the frequency with which laws are reviewed in the highest 
court. The prevalence of constitutional review probably depends on the 
specificity/clarity of constitutional provisions and the number of veto points in the 
legislative process. First, in Latin America, despite low public confidence in the 
judiciary, the adoption of new and voluminous constitutions led to the judicialization of 
politics. The judiciary came to exert a stronger influence than before against the 
legislature and the executive (Sieder et al 2005). In Columbia, the annual number of 
abstract review decisions ranged from 200s to 300s during 1993–2002, and in 2002, 27 
percent of the abstract reviews resulted in nullity decisions Every Columbian president 
since 1991 initiated constitutional amendment to overrule unconstitutionality decisions 
(Espinosa 2005, 76–77). In Argentina, during 1984–1995, on the annual average, more 
than one out of three constitutional reviews  ended up with unconstitutionality 
decisions (Smulovitz 2005). 
  Second, the more centralized the legislative processes (the less veto points), the 
greater is the likelihood that the government will pass confrontational bills. This in 
turn raises the probability of opposition recourse to constitutional review (Sweet 2000, 
54). For instance, in Germany, there are relatively few cases of abstract review (112 
referrals and 62 decisions during 1951–1991) since controversial legislation can be 
blocked by the upper house and coalition parties before it comes to the constitutional 
court (Stone 2002, 191–192). A third, less important, factor is the political use of review 
by parliamentarians to augment their weak positions or low visibility in the parliament. 
In Israel, expanded public access to judicial review as well as the introduction of 
primaries for party nomination urged a greater number of parliamentarians, 
particularly coalition backbenchers, to resort to judicial review. They adopted this tactic 
to gain media exposure even if their chances for winning were low (Dotan and Hofnung 
2005).  
 
 
Judicial Independence and Nullity Decisions 
 
Theoretically, whether the court can effectively exercise constitutional review must 
depend on judicial independence. In practice, however, judicial independence is usually 
defined as judicial autonomy to “overturn statutes or executive decisions,” thus 
constraining “the exercise of political power by current officeholders” (Vanberg 
2008,102). The prime focus of this section is, therefore, on factors that affect nullity 
decisions. These factors include the court position between the legislative and executive 
powers, the policy advocacy of the court, incumbent support for judicial independence, 
party competition, political balance, and public support for court positions/ideology. 
  First, court positioning and policy advocacy reflect the court’s strategic behavior to 
make decisions based on its own preferences. This tendency is most apparent in the 
United States, where the court can take advantage of the middle position in policy 
preferences between the legislative and executive branches of government. Judicial 
review might well involve the court’s calculation of possible overriding legislations by 
Congress and/or the president (Figueiredo et al. 2006, 207-212). Thus, “in a separation 
of powers system, the range of discretion and hence independence afforded the courts is 
a function of the differences between the elected branches” (Weingast 2002, 676). The 
court policy was not found to be influenced by judges’ personal background or 
demographic factors, but by their ideology, understood from judge evaluation in the 
columns of major newspapers when they were nominated (Johnson and Reynolds 2008, 
13; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995).  
The abovementioned separation of powers model was found to be applicable to 
countries other than the United States. Among emerging presidential democracies, in 
Argentina, for instance, the judiciary enjoys greater independence when the country is 
ruled by a divided than unified government (Chavez 2004). In Russia, the constitutional 
court has tried to establish its authority by strategically positioning itself between the 
president and the legislature. It has also learned to avoid issues such as federalism and 
separation of powers, which test the toleration of the executive and legislature, and to 
concentrate instead on individual rights issues (Epstein et al 2001). Even in the 
parliamentary system, where the legislative majority is usually controlled by the 
executive branch, the court can advance its preferred policy. Steunenberg’s (1997) case 
study of the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision supported the view that courts have their 
own policy preferences rather than seeking preservation of the status quo. Considering 
the empirical positions of political parties in parliament on euthanasia, the court’s 
decision on the issue was found not close to but much more liberal than the status quo, 
under which euthanasia constituted a criminal offence.  
Second, political balancing within the judiciary can enhance judicial independence. In 
Germany, the legislature respects the decisions of the Constitutional Court and passes 
and amends laws accordingly. Political affiliation of the judges does not affect court 
decisions but secures coordination with the legislature (Landfried 1994). The relatively 
high judicial independence in Germany is secured by political balancing rather than the 
exclusion of partisanship from the institution. Judges are allowed to affiliate with 
political parties, and the appointment of higher court judges takes into consideration a 
fair representation of various political views. In particular, for the Constitutional Court, 
both the upper and lower houses are involved in the appointment of judges: each house 
appoints eight of the total 16 judges. Consequently, the legislature respects court 
decisions and enacts or amends laws accordingly (Landfried 1994; Kommers 2001). 
Even in the United States, where Supreme Court judges are appointed by the president, 
there is an implicit rule that the president should choose judges of centrist ideology. 
Moreover, its competitive party system prevents the president from blatant interference 
in the matters of the judiciary—due to the prospect of retaliation after government 
change (Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2003, 127).  
  Third, the court also tries to attract public opinion on its decisions because high 
public support deters politicians’ challenge to judicial independence (Vanberg 2008, 
106–110). Dur et al. (2000) demonstrated with time-series data analysis that public 
support for the Supreme Court does not depend on court ideology (conservative/liberal) 
but on how close prevailing public opinion is to the ideology of court decisions. McGuire 
and Stimson’s (2004) time series analysis found supportive evidence that the ideology of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions reflect the prevailing public opinion. The researchers 
also criticized the conventional measurement of court ideology and adopted only 
reversal decisions as the measurement for the conservative/ liberal ideological direction 
of court decisions. This is because court decisions that affirm lower court decisions 
reflect not so much the ideological position of the court as the litigant’s error in the 
estimation of the court’s ideological position. Vanberg (2001) demonstrated that 
Germany’s Constitutional Court was more likely to strike unconstitutionality decisions 
when cases under review were more transparent and thus easier to monitor by the 
public. This finding supported his hypothesis that the court prefers public oversight of 
the legislature in anticipation of its disobedience to court decisions. Mexcico’s Supreme 
Court also used the media to promote its nullity decisions among the public (Staton 
2006). 
The above three conditions for judicial independence are more likely to be found in 
consolidated than unconsolidated democracies. Yet, even emerging democracies can rely 
on a fourth factor, party competition, to buttress judicial independence. When party 
competition for the elected office of the government is high, the threat of immediate 
reprisal against the court by the incumbent is reduced. High party competition 
therefore induces the court to make decisions less deferent to the incumbent. This is 
also a corollary from the findings of Ginsburg (2003) cited earlier. In postcommunist 
countries, institutional guarantees for judicial independence, including finality of 
decisions, judge terms, and conditions for judge removal, did not encourage 
constitutional courts to strike down laws (Smithey and Ishiyama 2002; Herron and 
Randazzo 2003). However, party system fragmentation and federalism were associated 
with nullity decisions (Smithey and Ishiyama 2002). Herron and Randazzo (2003) also 
showed that higher economic growth and stronger presidents led to fewer nullity 
decisions, whereas individual litigants and economic issues were associated with more 
frequent nullity decisions than other litigants or issues. These findings indicate that 
lack of party/political competition leaves the judiciary susceptible to pressure from the 
incumbent. 
Even if the executive has the authority to appoint and dismiss judges, elite 
competition and fragmentation can reduce political pressure of the incumbent for the 
judges. In both Malawi and Zambia, the judges of the High Court, which lies below the 
Supreme Court, are subject to removal by the president. The results of two regressions 
showed, however, that only in Zambia judges tended to decide in favor of the 
government. In Zambia, the governing party is stronger and thus stays in power longer, 
whereas in Malawi, political parties are more fragmented and government changes are 
more likely. In Malawi, therefore, judicial decisions were affected not by whether the 
president was a party to the case but by whether the judge belonged to the same ethnic 
group as the president (VonDoepp 2006). A comparative assessment of constitutional 
review in three Asian countries after democratic transitions also underscored the 
definitive importance of party system competition/fragmentation particularly. The weak 
and fragmented party system in South Korea contributed to the high independence of 
its constitutional court, whereas dominant party systems in Taiwan and Mongolia 
enabled governing parties to concertedly use appointment authorities or legislative 
decisions to influence or override court decisions (Ginsburg 2003, 247–263). Moreover, 
even if there is a lack of political competition, alternative job opportunities for judges 
can contribute to judicial autonomy. In Namibia, despite the dominant one-party system 
and insufficient institutional guarantees for judicial independence, decisions of High 
and Supreme Court judges were largely unaffected by factors that might have induced 
deference to the government. Since the private sector offered higher salaries for lawyers 
than the judiciary, the judges had few reasons to stick to their posts by siding with the 
government (VonDoepp 2008). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The literature shows first that constitutional review spread in emerging democracies 
largely because elites of old regimes needed insurance to preserve their power under 
democratic regimes. This insurance effect of constitutional review contributes to 
democratic transitions and consolidation by reducing their sense of threat and making 
democratic regimes acceptable to them. Second, constitutional review can make 
democracy self-enforcing if there is sufficient competition among political parties or 
between the legislative and executive branches of government. In a more sophisticated 
case, political balance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions. 
In addition, the court expects that public support for and media exposure of its decisions 
would deter overriding legislations.  
More research is required, however, into judicial accountability since an increasing 
number of recent studies have revealed the practice of deliberate counter-majoritarian 
review. The court, then, can be regarded as independent of the officeholder but colluding 
with the minority elite. Counter-majoritarian review may not be politically sustainable 
in the long run. Another neglected aspect is public support for the constitution. The 
constitution may have been imposed by the then ruling elite on the politically weaker 
but numerically larger part of society. Without “constitutional moments” (Ackerman 
1998) that arouse high popular mobilization and support, the constitution might well 
fail to bring about focal points built on social consensus. As the possibility of controversy 
and conflict over the constitution looms large, so the centrality of constitutional review 
in politics grows.  
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